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Abstract 
James J. Gibson’s concept of perceptual affordances has a long history, 
particularly within the field of human computer interaction (HCI) where the 
concept has been used in various ways to address both the material and cultural 
requirements of interactive systems. New modes of digital media which look to 
engage a range of affordances as present in contemporary smartphone platforms 
offer an opportunity to rethink this critical divide within the use of the concept 
of affordances. Defining a concordance between Gibson’s use of the term and 
Manuel DeLanda’s theory of assemblages, it becomes possible to chart the 
networks of affordances present in the interaction with and function of these 
new media forms. Through an analysis of Kate Pullinger’s Breathe, a redefined 
understanding of the possibilities of affordances is developed, one that is 
concerned with both the materiality of the system itself and the speculative frame 
that is developed. 
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Introduction 
There has long been contention running across a number of disciplines regarding the 
nature and reach of James J. Gibson’s (1986) concept of “affordances.” First 
introduced by Gibson in order to provide an account of visual perception in the field 
of environmental psychology, the concept was quickly taken up in a number of areas, 
particular in areas related to human-computer interaction (Norman 1988). There, it 
was used to provide an explanation for the ways that computer systems made 
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themselves available to users. While Gibson (1986) described the affordances of the 
environment as “what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes,” saying that 
affordances “are in a sense objective, real, and physical unlike values and meanings, 
which are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental” (129), the 
concept was subsequently used in an expanded fashion to have cognitive, cultural, and 
conventional implications (Norman, 2008). As the term came to take on this expanded 
meaning, it came to be subject to charges of the cultural relativism implicit in the 
identification of any affordance (Costall and Still, 1989). In this, questions were raised 
about the viability of the application of Gibson’s initial “objective, real, and physical” 
formulation of affordances within more complex cultural settings (Greeno, 1994; 
Turner, 2005; Costall, 2012). Such critique came to include a consideration of the 
implications that an information processing model of psychology has for Gibson’s 
theory (Jenkins, 2008). 
The importance of this long-running consideration of the conceptual power and 
usefulness of Gibson’s term is put into sharp relief by the work of the Ambient 
Literature project (ambientlit.com). Focusing on the design, implementation, and study 
of new modes of pervasive and literary media, the Ambient Literature project 
simultaneously engaged the material, functional, and semiotic affordances of 
interactive systems as they were utilized toward cultural and literary effect. As a form 
of situated media, the case of ambient literature provides a helpful example in 
addressing the question of the contemporary status of the term affordance. This comes 
as works of ambient literature engage physical location, literary meanings, and 
contemporary networks of information technology. In this article, the work Breathe by 
Kate Pullinger will be used as an example in order to draw out how Gibson’s term 
“affordance” can be understood today. 
In tracing out the various networks of affordances present in Breathe, what becomes 
evident is that for complex works of interactive and pervasive media it is not possible 
to disentangle material affordances from cultural ones. That is, a work like Breathe takes 
advantage of affordances that make perception physically possible in general, as well 
as affordances that rely on a learned familiarity with semiotic systems. Instead of 
distinguishing between “affordances in general” and “canonical affordances”, as does 
Alan Costall (2012), or between “simple” and “complex” affordances as does Phil 
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Tuner (2005), it becomes necessary to consider a more deeply-set ontological 
reconfiguration of the idea of how affordances can function.  
With this, the aim is to both contribute to the continued development of the term as 
well as to restore some of Gibson’s (1986) original meaning: 
It is a mistake to separate the natural from the artificial as if there were 
two environments; artifacts have to be manufactured from natural 
substances. It is also a mistake to separate the cultural environment from 
the natural environment, as if there were a world of mental products 
distinct from the world of material products (130). 
Expanding on this thematic within Gibson’s account of his concept, what this paper 
proposes is a re-consideration of the ontological terrain of affordances as they are 
considered within the field of digital media, particularly as works of ambient literature 
bridge the human reception of works with their material occurrence. Using Manuel 
DeLanda’s (2006; 2016) Deleuzian consideration of social assemblages and their 
interactions as a theoretical starting point, the case of the ambient literature project 
(and one work in particular) will be used to rework the idea of affordances in the study 
of interactive digital media along a materialist and flattened ontology.  
The paper will proceed as such: Following an introduction to ambient literature in 
general, the specific work which is to be examined, Breathe, will be described. Focusing 
on the foundation that such a work has in traditions of HCI, developments in the 
field’s use of the concept of affordances will be analyzed, highlighting the divide 
between physical and cultural uses of the term. As an answer to this problematic, 
Manuel DeLanda’s conception of social assemblages will be introduced, with particular 
attention paid to the way that these assemblages engage uses of language. Finally, 
Breathe will be reconsidered through this newly-developed theoretical lens and the 
implications of this consideration of affordances/assemblages will be discussed.   
Ambient Literature 
The ambient literature project was an ambitious, multi-university project focused on 
the conceptualization and development of new forms of literary media which “produce 
encounters between humans and the complex systems to which they are subject” 
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(Dovey, 2016: 140). It brought together academics, authors, designers, developers, 
media producers, coordinators, and support staff in order to create smartphone-based 
works of literature that took advantage of the modalities and networked connections 
afforded by contemporary information communication technology (ICT). The 
concept of ambient literature was developed with particular attention to way that ICT 
has been understood in the wake of Mark Weiser’s (1991) initial conceptualization of 
ubiquitous computing (ubicomp) in the late 1980s.  
The publication of Weiser's article on the development of the idea of ubicomp, “The 
Computer for the 21st Century,” laid out a vision for computing in which computers, 
as media, were relegated to a background, supporting role. Working with researchers 
at Xerox’s Palo Alto Research Center, the vision for the future of computing detailed 
by Weiser was one in which computers acted silently, in the background, taking care 
of the more mundane tasks of life, leaving users free to engage in creative and fulfilling 
activities. Instead of spending time and effort to schedule meetings, ubicomp systems 
would silently arrange meetings according to the various participants’ schedules, 
allowing them to focus on the important matters at hand. Coffee would be brewed in 
the morning, weather reports would be presented right when they were needed, the 
right document would be on your desk just in time to get to work. Computing would 
swirl all around us, always on, supporting us in our daily lives without the need for us 
to worry about engaging or maintaining the systems that made this possible. 
Computers would adapt to us, not us to them. 
A key aspect of the idea of ubicomp (or as it also came to be known under different 
branding, “pervasive computing” or “ambient intelligence” [Ronzani, 2009]) was that 
computing could be integrated seamlessly and quietly into the world around us (Weiser 
and Brown, 1997). Building on a vast array of data sources, from personal histories to 
city-wide sensor networks, ubicomp would embed computing into the fabric of our 
daily lives while at the same time ensuring that we never had to give it another thought. 
It would become ingrained in our environment and yet remain invisible. 
Of course, like most good visions of the future, the results of Weiser’s account of the 
development of computing was more complicated than initially envisioned (Chalmers 
and Galani, 2004; Rogers, 2006; Abowd, 2012). Political systems, national cultures, 
new technologies, and existing social configurations all served to moderate the 
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development of the ideas first laid out in ubiquitous computing (Bell and Dourish, 
2007). Importantly, however, even as ubicomp’s early vision of a world run on 
computational rails hit a number of roadblocks and false starts, it did inform the 
development of the modern smartphone, a device which relies on always-on 
computing, vast troves of user data, and arrays of sensor and information 
communication networks. As our lives have become enveloped by computing and 
networks of data in the wake of the smartphone, the question asked by ambient 
literature is “what might happen when data aspires to literary form” (Dovey, 2016: 
140)? As ubicomp – or at least one version of ubicomp – becomes mundane and part 
of our everyday lives, how can it be transformed into a resource for aesthetic and 
specifically literary experiences which tap into our common cultural heritages?  
The proposition of Ambient Literature is to take ubicomp’s model of a data-enabled 
world and to turn it around: instead of using techniques developed to push mundane 
interactions to the periphery of our attention, how can these same techniques be used 
to surface literary experiences as they exist around us? How can literary experiences be 
blended in with the world around the reader in an immersive way? In this, works of 
ambient literature look to build upon Weiser’s vision in order to integrate creative 
works of literature and culture into the world around readers. As works which are 
embedded within a wider world through the use of mobile devices, networks, and the 
vast arrays of data available, how do these works come to afford certain interactions 
and implications?  
Kate Pullinger’s Breathe 
As a research project, Ambient Literature was structured around the commissioning 
of three new works of digital media, each of which was focused on the idea of 
developing experiences which connected textual literature to the situation of their 
experience. More than just a program of creative practice research (Smith and Dean, 
2009; Nelson, 2013), the project was also surrounded by a program of empirical 
participant research. While some of the outcomes of this empirical work will be 
included here, the methodology and analysis will not be discussed. A more thorough 
account of the methodological approach can be found elsewhere (Marcinkowski, 
2018). A complete record of the research data collected around the project has also 
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been made available through an open access data repository (Marcinkowski and 
Spencer, 2018).  
Of the three works commissioned and studied by the Ambient Literature project, I 
want to focus here on just one that illustrates the particular thematic that is to be 
developed. Breathe, by Kate Pullinger (2018), is a work of ambient literature designed 
to be read through a smartphone’s web browser. Made in partnership with the 
London-based publisher Visual Editions and Google Creative Labs, it is a short story-
sized text, ideally meant to be read in one sitting at home.  
A ghost story set in the present day, Breathe haunts the reader through a text that is 
altered by the conditions of its reading. Reading the time and location from the system, 
the piece draws in local conditions into the work: time of day, weather, nearby streets, 
cafes, the season, and so on are all adapted based on the conditions of reading and 
woven into the text. Drawing from Google’s own place-based APIs (Application 
Programming Interfaces), the world of Breathe is populated by a continually developing 
account of the reader’s surroundings. If a new shop opens nearby, Google’s databases 
are updated and the set of resources available to Breathe is expanded to include this. 
This is not a choose your own adventure or branching narrative – the narrative of the 
piece remains the same for all readers – but the experience is customized for each 
reader depending on their situation.  
At the same time that it relies on the networked and locational affordances of the 
smartphone in order to create an uncanny sense of familiarity with the reader’s setting, 
Breathe also engages readers’ learned habits of interaction as part of the work itself. 
While presenting an initial interactive paradigm which mimics that of a traditional 
ebook, allowing readers to flip from page to virtual page, the experience unexpectedly 
shifts as the reader finds swiping to be no longer consistently effective. Without 
explanation, text starts running backwards, “unwriting” itself on the screen; readers’ 
swipes only leave black smudges across the white background of the page; the page of 
text is covered by shifting clouds; while in other instances text is only visible as the 
reader tilts their phone at an angle, as if trying to read through an obfuscating glare on 
the glass.   
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In all of these ways, the work announces its non-traditional nature to the reader, taking 
advantage of learned habits of interaction in order to surprise the reader and force 
them to reflect on their normal, seamless engagement with their device. Paired with an 
uncanny knowing of their whereabouts and situation, the readers’ experience comes 
to focus on the affordances of the device, what it is capable of doing, and how. Breathe 
emphasizes the specific interactive modalities of the smartphone and uses those 
modalities as part of the ambiance of the experience.  
As will be developed, what Breathe presents is a unique confluence of textual, 
contextual, learned, and physically material conditions which, when taken together, 
complicate an easy account of the affordances of which the work takes advantage. It 
relies on both the immediate and local conditions of its reading, while at the same time 
relying on far-flung and network-enabled determinations. 
What is an affordance in computing?  
I’ve been coy about it so far, and hopefully the term has just slipped by as you’ve been 
reading, but for an article that attempts to re-work the idea of what “affordance” can 
mean in the space of digital media, I’ve used various forms of “affordance” in a very 
casual, but hopefully nevertheless intelligible manner. After all, it’s been more than 50 
years since Gibson first used the term “affordance” in the field of environmental 
psychology to describe what an environment offers to an animal, and it’s been at least 
30 years since it has filtered into common usage, especially in the field of human-
computer interaction (HCI) research.   
“Affordances” came to become a central concept in HCI largely through the work of 
Don Norman (1988) and his book The Psychology of Everyday Things.1 In it, Norman 
described how various objects – doors, coffee pots, washing machines, telephones, 
computer interfaces – all played into people’s existing cognitive models about how the 
world worked. By providing a link to users’ existing models, such objects gave 
individuals some clue as to how these objects might “afford” some kind of interaction. 
As a doorknob provides a surface able to support a human hand gripping, turning, and 
pulling, it provides an indication of its purpose. Norman’s logic was that in the work 
of design, it would be beneficial to tap into users’ existing cognitive models in order 
 
1 The book was later re-released under the title The Design of Everyday Things (Norman, 2013). 
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to help them understand unfamiliar interfaces. As such, if the aim was to design 
something to be pulled or turned, it might be helpful to have it resemble some familiar 
aspect of a doorknob. 
This link between affordances and cognitive models led to affordances in HCI being 
largely seen as a concept linked to cognitive psychology. This was distinct from 
Gibson’s original environmental formulation of the concept. Instead of focusing on 
the relationship between an organism (in Norman’s case, human users) and their 
environment (the computer interface), Norman cast affordances as depending on a 
sense of familiarity from the perspective of the organism. For Gibson, the concept 
was not related to what went on inside the head of the animal or the way in which they 
recognized objects in their environment but was concerned with the fundamental and 
really-existing relationship between animals and their environment. Already here, the 
tension between the situational nature of a work like Breathe – as it brings the reader’s 
environment into contact with the work – and the learned and culturally-meaningful 
text becomes apparent.  
What became problematic in Norman’s human-centered account of affordances was 
the possibility that any discussion of the affordances of a system relied on a culturally-
relativistic position (Costall and Still, 1989). That is, instead of affordances describing 
a physical relationship between animals and their environment, it came to rely on a 
learned cultural accumulation of habit or knowledge. For computing, of course, the 
default position of such cultural learning came to be based on a largely North 
American, white, and male perspective. In this, there was a fundamental blindness to 
the culturally imperialistic aspects of computer interfaces as they were exported around 
the world (Philip et al., 2010). 
This early dislocation (and the resulting problems) of the meaning of the term 
“affordances” as it was used in HCI was not lost on Norman, who later sought to 
clarify the meaning of the term for an HCI audience. As a corrective, he attempted to 
draw a distinction between Gibson’s “real affordances” and the version of the concept 
that he employed, which pointed to those that are perceived by users. In providing an 
account of the kind of “perceived affordances” described in The Psychology of Everyday 
Things, Norman (1999) highlighted the distinction between the two uses of the term: 
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Please don’t confuse affordance with perceived affordances. Don’t 
confuse affordances with conventions. Affordances reflect the possible 
relationships among actors and objects: they are properties of the world 
(42).  
In clarifying the role of affordances in thinking about user-centered design, Norman 
highlights an important issue for understanding Gibson’s concept of affordances: that 
they are distinct from the kinds of cultural conventions that make up much of our 
interactive lives. This highlights Gibson’s (1986) assertion that affordances should be 
thought of as “objective, real, and physical” and that they are “unlike values and 
meanings” (129). This, of course, clarifies one perspective of the affordances of a work 
like Breathe: that it relies upon the objective affordances of ICT, sensor networks, and 
smartphones to deliver the media experience to readers.  
This tidy picture, however, is complicated by the nevertheless relational nature of 
affordances and the “possible relationships among actors and objects.” As Gibson put 
it, describing a kind of relativism distinct from the kinds of cultural relativism 
Norman’s account was accused of: 
They are not just abstract physical properties. They have unity relative to 
the posture and behavior of the animal being considered. So an affordance 
cannot be measured as we measure in physics (127-128). 
That is, in its original use, the idea of affordances was linked to the particular 
configuration of the given animal to which it was applied as it exists within a particular 
environment. For Gibson, affordances offered “surfaces” which support the actions 
of actors within their environment. Different pools of water of different depths offer 
different affordances to fish as to cats. A leaf affords a surface upon which an insect 
might walk, but not a human. In this, the term lays out a murky space that exists 
between a physical reality that can be measured and a kind of phenomenological and 
existential being. Linked to the situation and context of their encounter, affordances 
are tied to abilities and actions. 
This terrain of considering affordances at once physical, separate from values, and 
relative to the animal considered opens up a particular space for the consideration of 
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interactions with digital media. As the idea of affordances has been previously seen to 
resist an accounting of the kinds of cultural relativism built into its use in fields beyond 
psychology (Costall and Still, 1989), in what ways is it possible to account for 
affordances in human interactions, particularly as they are laden with meanings and 
implications? For thinking about affordances in the light of digital media, how is it 
possible to divorce meanings and values from the “objective, real, and physical” 
properties of the media? 
Where Costall (2012) and Turner (2005) make claims for a bifurcated sense of 
affordances, with canonical or complex affordances on one site and general or simple 
affordances on the other, Norman’s reconsideration (1999) of his use of the concept 
takes a more nuanced view. In Norman’s revised account, perceived affordances sit 
atop real affordances, with real affordances making the perception of affordances 
possible. Unlike Costall’s and Turner’s approach of distinguishing classes of 
affordances by type, Norman opts for a progressive distinction, with “real” 
affordances underlying their perception. Perceived affordances only come about 
because of their relation to real ones. Turner and Costall, on the other hand, create 
new categories of affordances that, following Norman’s initial mischaracterization, 
offer a phenomenological rendering of affordances. They rely on the development of 
a specialized vocabulary to distinguish what is afforded culturally or by convention 
from what is offered by the physical environment itself.  
Even as he draws a connection between real and perceived affordances, Norman 
(1999) nevertheless maintains a firm distinction between affordances and symbolic 
communication: 
Far too often I hear graphical designers claim that they have added an 
affordance to the screen design when they have done nothing of the sort. 
Usually they mean that some graphical depiction suggests to the user that 
a certain action is possible. This is not affordance, neither real nor 
perceived. Honest, it isn’t. It is a symbolic communication, one that works 
only if it follows a convention understood by the user (40). 
What I want to put forward in the coming sections is specifically that symbolic 
communication can be understood as an affordance. This is to be based largely on the 
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idea that symbolic communication (and cultural action more generally) can be 
understood as a kind of physical system which is “relative to the posture and behavior 
of the animal being considered” (Gibson, 1986: 127-128). That is, systems of 
inscription and interpretation can be viewed as physical components of the animal and 
their environment. While there isn’t space in this paper for a full rendering of the 
background of this consideration, it is relevant to point to Simon and Newell’s account 
of physical symbol systems in the field of artificial intelligence (Newell and Simon, 
1976), particularly as it collides with Lucy Suchman’s account of situated action (Vera 
and Simon, 1993; Suchman, 2006). Put directly, the interpretation of symbolic systems 
is an activity that an animal takes part in given a certain posture of the body (the 
physical capacity to read and the established physical cognitive structures for reading, 
for instance) and the affordance of the environment (the inscription of text on a page, 
for example). Air affords a surface for birds who have learned to fly, an exit sign 
affords the person who can read a part of the surface for escaping from a fire.  
Maintaining any distinction between cultural and physical affordances becomes 
difficult, if not untenable, as interactive modalities, such as those present in a work like 
Breathe, explicitly engage with physical forms which rely on culturally symbolic 
interactions for their function. For Breathe, it is not possible to simply bifurcate 
affordances into two distinct varieties. One avenue for the theoretical re-consideration 
of affordances comes via Manuel DeLanda’s account of the material capacities of 
assemblages. By rending a reading of DeLanda along a trajectory laid out by Gibson, 
it becomes possible to develop a provisional picture of how a work like Breathe might 
function. In this, it becomes possible to understand Breathe’s various component 
interactions (with the text, the environment, the smartphone interface) along a single 
conception of “affordances.” 
Affordances, capacities 
DeLanda’s account of social assemblages takes ideas developed in the work of Gilles 
Deleuze (and others) and gives them an immediate illustration in the formations of 
our contemporary social world. Providing a framing for the ways that social forms 
come into being, DeLanda’s work is reminiscent of Harold Garfinkel’s (1967) 
ethnomethodology and the more closely related work of Bruno Latour (2005) and 
others (Law and Hassard, 1999) in the area of Actor Network Theory. In these 
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approaches, despite their sometimes-strong differences, the idea of a cohesive and a 
priori social form is refuted by a kind of emergent and localized occurrence of social 
interactions. 
In laying out a theory of social assemblage, DeLanda presents an ontological account 
of the fundamental organization of social forms. This relies on a realist consideration 
of how the various structures (assemblages) that make up our social world come in 
and out of being, and interact with each other, as well as the role that human beings 
play as part of this process. For DeLanda (2006), these assemblages are characterized 
by “relations of exteriority.” This means that “a component part of an assemblage may 
be detached from it and plugged into a different assemblage in which its interactions 
are different” (10). 
For DeLanda (2006), the span of the exteriority of the identity of social entities is 
demonstrated “not only by their properties but also by their capacities, that is, by what 
they are capable of doing when they interact with other social entities” (7). Here, 
“capacities” becomes a central term, particularly because of its relative homology with 
Gibson’s affordances. The kinds of extrinsic relationships built up beyond any kind of 
internal affiliation between disparate things favored in DeLanda’s ontology provides a 
first description of Gibson’s affordances: in deducing affordances, the animal is 
considered relative to the environment within which it exists. The affordance appears 
only in the conjunction of the animal against some surface. For an assemblage, this 
conjunction takes place based on the capacities of each assemblage involved. Just as 
Gibson’s affordances are relative to the animal and expressed only as a sense of 
possibility given the particular arrangement within the environment, so too is 
DeLanda’s sense of capacities: 
We can distinguish, for example, the properties defining a given entity 
from its capacities to interact with other entities. While its properties are 
given and may be denumerable as a closed list, its capacities are not given 
– they may go unexercised if no entity suitable for interaction is around – 
and form a potentially open list, since there is no way to tell in advance in 
what way a given entity may affect or be affected by innumerable other 
entities (10). 
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The user, in this case, is not a user in and of itself, but only in their interactions with 
some system and vice versa. The reader of Breathe cannot be understood separately 
from their reading of the work, even as they may nevertheless be readers of other 
works. 
As DeLanda (2016: 1) describes it, quoting Deleuze (2007): “the assemblage’s only 
unity is that of co-functioning” (69). He goes on to say that in Deleuze’s definition, 
“two aspects of the concept are emphasized: that the parts that are fitted together are 
not uniform either in nature or in origin, and that the assemblage actively links these 
parts together by establishing relations between them” (2). This is essential here, since 
this concept of assemblages is applicable to not only thinking about the assemblage of 
a user and a system, or the reader and a work like Breathe, but also the ways that the 
system or the reader themselves are constituted according to their relations of 
exteriority.  
Just as Gibson’s affordances “cannot be measured as we measure in physics,” the 
interactive capabilities of an assemblage’s capacities are likewise beyond the purview 
of a positivist accounting:  
But in an assemblage these relations may be only contingently obligatory. 
While logically necessary relations may be investigated by thought alone, 
contingently obligatory ones involve a consideration of empirical 
questions, such as the coevolutionary history of two species (11). 
In both, the actions of any user, the manner in which they configure the movements 
of their body and position themselves in relation to some environment depends on 
their own intentions and aims as they go about engaging with a system. There is no 
logical necessity that links users’ actions and the affordances/capacities of a system. 
This has been demonstrated in any number of examples of the re-purposing of systems 
for novel uses (the evolution of Twitter provides a good example of this [Siles, 2013]).  
Even as the definition of capacities remains contingent and dependent on the 
conditions of their relations, how they are perceived is immaterial to their causes. In 
this, assemblages share in the conceptually independent nature of affordances, 
particularly considering Norman’s stated reconsideration and explication of the 
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distinction between real and perceived affordances. Like Gibson’s affordances, 
DeLanda’s (2006) theory of assemblages is wholly realist, with “the very fact that it 
cuts across the nature-culture divide” being “evidence of its realist credentials” (3). 
This being consistent with Gibson’s (1986) own proposition that it is a “mistake to 
separate the cultural environment from the natural environment” (128).  
This is illustrated in Breathe as it comingles jarring interactive paradigms, the activation 
of global data networks, and a semiotic reading of text toward a singular meaningful 
affordance of the work. The perceived affordances of the alternating intuitive and 
counter-intuitive work in tandem with the real affordances of the networked systems. 
These are in turn surfaced to the reader in their reading of the text as it takes advantage 
of them as part of a semiotic system. 
What begins to develop in bringing these two systems into contact with one another 
is a slow dissolve of the boundaries established separating real affordances from any 
sense of cultural or conditioned connection. While Gibson explicitly denies the 
immediate connection between “values and meanings” and affordances in his initial 
formulation, it is not difficult to see how there may nevertheless be a connection: 
Behavior affords behavior, and the whole subject matter of psychology 
and of the social sciences can be thought of as an elaboration of this basic 
fact. Sexual behavior, nurturing behavior, fighting behavior, cooperative 
behavior, economic behavior, political behavior – all depend on the 
perceiving of what another person or other persons afford, or sometimes 
the mis-perceiving of it (135). 
While affordances themselves might have no intrinsic value, they nevertheless serve to 
impart some communication of value. This is the case as they are the medium by which 
it becomes possible to interpret some relational cue. Just as they provide the solid 
substance of surfaces to stand on in Gibson’s account, so do affordances and capacities 
offer a more dynamic sense of relation. What can be seen in each, both in Gibson’s 
affordances and in DeLanda’s assemblages, is that they can play a variety of roles, as 
DeLanda (2006) puts it: “from a purely material role at one extreme of the axis, to a 
purely expressive role at the other extreme” (12). The assemblage of a work like Breathe, 
as it establishes and motivates relationships between distinct parts (the text, the 
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technologies at play, the situation of the reader, the readers themselves, and so on), 
cuts across all these types of roles. For Breathe, as a literary work, what comes to matter 
is the particular way that this re-figured sense of affordances might engage questions 
relating to a linguistic text. 
Codes, coding, coded surfaces 
In examining the relationship between affordances and language, it is important to 
approach the issue of “coding” as it is present in DeLanda’s work. While a 
consideration of the affordances of Breathe in light of DeLanda’s assemblages is 
relatively straightforward, the question of language provides an opportunity to delve 
deeper into the connection between assemblages and affordances. In Breathe, this 
question of language is driven by the interplay among the interface of the work, the 
wider situation within which the work is read, and the text itself.  
Following Deleuze and Guattari (1988), DeLanda’s account of assemblages includes a 
consideration of “territorializing” and “deterritorializing” movements. Such 
movements are put into motion by the stabilization and destabilization of the identity 
of assemblages. Put briefly, as assemblages are subject to processes of territorialization, 
they sharpen their boundaries and increase their homogeneity. As they are subject to 
deterritorialization, their boundaries become less defined and they become more 
diverse.  
Here, what is most important is the way that processes of territorialization lead to 
processes of “coding” or the formalization of communicative assemblages. This can 
be seen in the case of language, genetics, and other forms of reproducible patterns of 
communication. That is, through the various capacities of an assemblage, as they come 
to be stabilized, specific reproducible formations arise which allow for the systematic 
coding and decoding of an assemblage’s capacities. In this, coding is not expressive as 
in the sense above, as expression is considered as an in-formal process. Coding, 
however, represents a kind of reification of expression into a formal system. Where 
the territorialization of an assemblage represents a first articulation of this kind of 
expression, coding represents a second, formalizing system in which the definition of 
rigid rules develops protocols for reproduction. Decoding, on the other hand, 
represents that moment in which these rigid rules are broken down, as in the case of 
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informal conversations in which more formal protocols of conversation might not be 
met. 
What this consideration of coding as a unique feature of assemblages puts forward is 
not that different from considerations of canonical or complex affordances. In each, 
there is some division between the sheer material aspects of affordances and those that 
serve some higher, information-processing ends. Just as Gibson saw affordances in 
the composure or posture of animals to each other while also allowing for the idea that 
affordances are not accorded with values and meanings, so too can it be seen that the 
expressive capacities of assemblages are distinct from codes such as language. For 
DeLanda, however, even as this coding might be of an order above the regular 
relations of the capacities of assemblages, they are still cut from the same cloth and are 
part of an overarching continuum of capacities.  
This is illustrated in Breathe as the canonical affordances of an interaction with an ebook 
(swiping from one page of text to another) is disrupted. The disruption caused by 
readers not being able to swipe smoothly from one page to the next comes to be linked 
with a semantic shift in the work from that of a straightforward narrative to one that 
speaks directly to the reader. The expressive deterritorializing move of the interactive 
shift cascades into a deterritorializing of the terms of the coded languages at work.  
In building from this account of the common ground between affordances and 
capacities toward this consideration of expressive surfaces and the territorialized 
process of coding, the aim is to be able to set language and culture on an even terrain 
with other kinds of affordances present in a digital system. As hinted at above, this is 
not the first such attempt toward this, with the work of Herbert Simon and Alan 
Newell (1976) working on the problem from the other end, so to speak; building up 
from computational models out toward a synthesis of human intelligence and 
understanding. At the foundation of this, for them, lay an assertion of the physical 
nature of cognition; not in an embodied sense, but in a sense which saw cognition 
taking place through the logical manipulation of physical symbol systems.  
By positing the existence of an assemblage below that of the human – the physical 
symbol system – Simon and Newell saw the possibility for the construction of artificial 
means of human intelligence that would be independent of a human identity. Viewed 
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in this light, the coding of human culture, of language, and of basic thought, is not 
intrinsic to the human, but an extrinsic system of relations that has simply been 
subsumed into the human organism as part of a wider assemblage.  
In this, the assemblage of a language faculty (of coding and decoding meaning into 
transmittable forms) functions simply as another material affordance for the human. 
This follows from both Gibson’s and DeLanda’s accounts: This is seen in Gibson’s 
(1986) relativistic account of affordances as having a “unity relative to the posture and 
behavior of the animal being considered” (127-128). Similarly, it can be found in 
DeLanda’s (2006) description of the way that an assemblage’s capacities “may go 
unexercised if no entity suitable for interaction is around – and form a potentially open 
list, since there is no way to tell in advance in what way a given entity may affect or be 
affected by innumerable other entities” (10). The capacity of a language act functions 
as an affordance to the human organism to whom it matters.  
Breathe (and works of ambient literature more broadly) take this link between 
traditional, physical affordances and those given in language as a matter of course. In 
these works, the physical affordances of place and a reader’s embeddedness within a 
situation are aligned along a common engagement of affordances. This common base 
runs from the capacities of the component assemblages of the work through coded 
systems of language.  
Building from Gibson’s (1986) earlier quoted assertion that “[b]ehavior affords 
behavior” (135), it is possible to say that the linguistic posture put forward as a 
meaningful expression on the part of one party of a conversation is taken up by the 
listener, who, in reading the message as it is materially transmitted, has some activation 
of the awareness of potential affordances and future capacities that are to be made 
available. In this, language and a specific sense of a functional cultural relativism 
(knowing and being affected by a certain language) comes to be illustrative of what 
might be termed a “speculative affordance.” This notion of a speculative affordance is 
one founded on the possibility of the proper set of capacities being present in the 
environment (the environment in this case coming to include other people). This 
speculative nature of affordances was something for which the use of Gibson’s 
concept was critiqued by Martin Oliver (2005). In responding to Gibson’s account of 
the possibility of affordances, Oliver stated that “all that could be said then is that a 
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thing afforded something to someone in a specific circumstance” (403). While Oliver’s 
critique appears to be valid along a traditional reading of affordances, it is just this kind 
of speculative configuration that has been noted in relation to audiences’ engagement 
with works of ambient literature (Marcinkowski, 2019). 
Instead of partitioning affordances into two regions, those that are cultural affordances 
and those that are not, what is given here is a more general consideration of 
affordances. This comes as the affordance of the possibility of affordances, one which 
comes to house both material affordances and their relative potential, as well as a 
phenomenological type of affordance as it has been heretofore known. While this kind 
of speculative affordance is undergirded by the theory of assemblages and their 
capacities, as given by DeLanda, in its application to questions of digital media it retains 
Gibson’s utility in the analysis of interactions. In this, it merges two distinct aspects of 
experience: first, the double articulation of a system of coding as it is read along a 
realist trajectory of the existence of physical systems; second, the relational rendering 
of the surfaces which afford this kind of articulation to take place.  
The mechanics of a work of ambient literature displays this in a double way. First, and 
most evidently, this comes in the way that the text of the work is supported by the 
environment. In Breathe, the reading of the text is linked to the situation of its reading. 
Second, the possibility for this interpretation of the code of the text is only possible 
because of the networked affordances of the platform that make the conditional text 
possible. That is, the physical affordances linking technological systems (as will be 
discussed in the next section below) set up the conditions for the interpretive reading 
of the text. 
As concepts, Gibson’s affordances and DeLanda’s account of the capacities of 
assemblages are unique, but in their consonance, they begin to develop a picture of the 
material interactions that contribute to human interactions with technological and 
cultural systems. The basic premise of their concomitance here is to put forward a view 
of material affordances or the capacities of assemblages that is able to account for 
systems of values and meaning. This is given not as a separate layer or special type of 
affordance or capacity, but as part of a continuum occurring across a flattened 
ontological space. Consonant with affordances, capacities describe the possible 
conjunction of surfaces, whether these surfaces are such as those concerning an animal 
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in its environment or any other type of assemblage. At bottom, DeLanda’s account of 
the capacities of assemblages opens the way for a thinking of a sense of affordances in 
which there is a more general system. Such a system provides for both people and the 
physical systems with which they interact, from culture to the materials of 
communication themselves. 
Affording the assembled interface 
In merging these veins of thought together toward a re-thinking of the idea of 
affordances, it is possible to think of affordances beyond just human or animal 
engagement with the world. It becomes possible to include language and culture 
alongside the material of their enaction. In examining digital media, this comes to 
include, importantly, the proposition of the function of ICT itself. That is, the 
smartphone not only affords human grasping as it is of a shape and size such that it 
can be held in the hand, but it also affords layers of network protocols, stacks of code, 
and APIs. Our telecommunication networks present vast assemblages. In these, each 
component is not determined by its interior relations, but instead by what it makes 
possible within the broader network. The capacities of each of the assemblages provide 
a coded and territorializing linkage within the network. That is, each segment of the 
ICT network presents an affordance to the other, a configuration that is both material 
and coded allowing for further territorialization and growth of the assemblage. 
This is a connection between the idea of the interface of a digital system offering 
affordances to users, as is commonly discussed, and a more remote or hidden set of 
interfaces, as discussed by Christian Ulrik Andersen and Søren Bro Pold (2018) with 
their concept of the “metainterface.” With this, they set up an aesthetic and analytic 
argument for the consideration of the interface in digital cultural works that extends 
beyond the immediate interface and begins to look at the layers of interfaces that exist 
invisibly within systems. The interface of a system, the traditional moment in which 
the affordances of a system are made evident to users, is pushed back to come to 
include the platform itself. For Andersen and Pold, this becomes worthy of 
consideration as these systems play a central part in contemporary society.  
For them, the hidden layers of the interface have an aesthetic proposition of their own, 
both because these layers of interfaces display a specific kind of aesthetic, and because 
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they are pervasive and enveloping. Here, as an accounting of the affordances of a 
digital system is expanded to include physical capacities and cultural codings, this 
thinking of the metainterface provides some guiding clarity toward the political 
ramifications of our present systems. As the conception of Gibson’s assemblages is re-
oriented toward being thought of in terms of assemblages, what does it mean for 
thinking about the possibilities of systematic control? 
Such an idea as the meta-interface contributes a thinking of the entirety of a digital 
system as representing the capacities or concordances of the system, and highlights the 
cultural force that the hidden backend of digital systems can exert upon the experience 
of the user. This understanding of how the metainterface itself becomes a surface for 
interaction will be critical for thinking about how Pullinger’s Breathe can be 
conceptualized under this re-framed conception of the affordance. 
Material capacities of networked affordances 
An initial consideration of the affordances of Breathe is straightforward enough. As a 
smartphone-based webapp, Breathe relies on an interface of affordances that initially 
coincides with the uses of a smartphone. Readers touch the screen, swipe, and engage 
with the work almost exactly as they have learned to interact with an ebook on a 
smartphone: they read each page, sliding their finger across it from right to left to flip 
over to the next page when they are done with the first. In this, it relies on an interactive 
paradigm which is easy to describe in the kinds of terms that Norman might use to 
describe the perceived affordances of an interaction which builds on the groundwork 
of possibility laid by “real” affordances. By having a cognitive model of the way that 
books and ebooks work, readers are able to easily engage with the piece. Beyond this 
sense of perceived affordances, the size, texture, and proximity of the glass screen of 
the phone affords a surface for touching. 
From this, the work begins to engage the cognitive model of the reader directly in the 
narrative itself. As the reader is introduced to the supernatural elements of the story, 
their normal cognitive models for interaction begin to falter: instead of being able to 
easily swipe from page to page, the path of their finger across the screen leaves a black 
trail, leaving them to puzzle over how to move on. Depending on how they are holding 
their phone, pages become obscured by opaque shadows revealing new text; texts 
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become automatically covered over by new text; instead of pages swiping away, the 
text runs backwards. In this, the fact of the affordance, both real and perceived, comes 
to play an expressive role in the work.  
In this, affordances – like capacities – are used in an expressive way. They become 
intermingled with the text which is itself dependent on the possibility of gathering 
situational information from the phone’s sensors and networked connections. In this, 
the experience of the work is not defined by the totality of the system itself, but by the 
relations of exteriority of the components which, through their own systems of 
capacities, come together to form the assemblage of the work. The narrative, the 
smartphone, the web browser, the network stack, the cellular network, global systems 
of geolocation, the vast databases of local information compiled by Google, networks 
of weather data – all of these exist in an independent fashion while being “held 
together” by the work. As a work, Breathe represents a global assemblage combining 
the material affordances of machine code, human language, and all the various 
modalities of communication that allow them to be brought together. In this, at each 
turn, the capacities of these various material assemblages afford the possibility of the 
work, and vice versa. The touch screen, cellular networks, databases, GPS satellites, 
mobile processors, smartphone software, and socio-technical system of information 
gathering utilized by Google comes into conjunction with other assemblages of the 
neighborhood streets, shop names, weather systems, seasons, and, importantly, the 
reader’s knowledge and recognition of these conditions. As in DeLanda’s account of 
the capacities at play in assemblages, all of these various components have both 
material and expressive roles which are not easily disentangled. As Breathe makes 
conscious use of the affordances of digital technology as a tool for narrative 
development, it is easy to recognize a reconfigured account of affordances at work. 
The expressive capacities at work have functional implications and vice versa.  
With Breathe, it is possible to trace out the assemblages at work up and down the 
networked stack of affordances and the linguistic text of the work. It displays codings 
which range from the wholly programmatic computer code that supports the work all 
the way through the fuzzy algorithms employed for location detection to the human 
readable language of the text itself. At each of these junctions, there are various 
capacities at work that allow for the interaction of assemblages, from the backend 
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systems of the work which know how to appropriately call APIs to the moments in 
which literate readers are presented with an intelligible text. As such, it is necessary to 
attend to two levels simultaneously: the first comes with a consideration of the 
mechanisms of ICT by which symbolic interactions enact the worldwide networks 
making up the technical function of the work itself; the second comes at the moment 
of the interaction with the reader, as they, situated within the capacities of these 
networks, are offered opportunities for some recognition of the material capacities of 
the setting that they are in.  
As the reader engages with the work, they partake in processes of territorialization and 
deterritorialization as they alternately coalesce and scatter the assemblage of the work 
through their reading. On the one hand, their reading establishes a homogeneity of the 
component parts of the work, bringing them together under the banner of a single 
work. On the other, their specific reading under their own specific conditions leads to 
an ultimately heterogeneous identity of the work. 
In this, the meanings of the work are the result of the physical affordances and 
capacities of their environment. In the sense-based experience of the work, the 
surfaces with which readers engage are not just those that are immediate to them, but 
those that they can also see from a distance, without seeing them directly. The 
networked capacities provide meaning in only this speculative way. The affordances 
of the work are not simply divided between physical or perceived affordances. Instead, 
they may be traced along the various material networks of affordances that make both 
the technology and the meaning of the work possible. As a piece of digital media, 
Breathe works across these networks of material affordances as it engages the 
movement and comportment of the reader toward their phone. At the same time, 
these material networks of assemblages also provide the material codes necessary for 
the language and computer code necessary for making the networked actions possible.  
The cultural affordance of speculation 
From all that has been said, it is clear that Breathe functions as an assemblage, more 
than even just at the kind of theoretical and ontological level established by DeLanda. 
It relies on readers, the text, smartphones, the situation of the reader, their 
geographical surroundings, sensor networks, remote databases, global information 
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networks, and the various individual and shared histories that make these parts fit 
together. Across all of these are networks of capacities that serve to interlink and 
provide these separate components with the identity of the work called Breathe. But 
how does this appear to the reader? If we are to follow along the trajectory of the use 
of the term “affordance” from Gibson to Norman and beyond, continuing to think of 
the interface and the question of human-centered design, what should we think of the 
moment when this interlinked assemblage of capacities comes to matter to the user?  
For readers of Breathe, what comes to be the common locus for their engagement with 
the work is a persistent concern with what the work affords, and how it affords it. 
What gives the work its force, as a contemporary ghost story about lost mothers and 
the refugee crisis in Europe, is that readers are left adrift wondering how – and along 
what kinds of affordances – the work might play out. This sentiment was on display 
in interviews with readers of Breathe (Marcinkowski, 2019).  
This unsteadiness in the possibilities of the work is something that has already been 
discussed in terms of the shifting interaction paradigms. As the conventions of 
interactions with ebooks are consciously undermined by the work, readers are left 
without a stable footing at the level of their perceived affordances. More importantly, 
however, it is through the speculative capacities at work in the networked assemblage 
of the work that the unique formulation of affordances described here can be seen 
most strongly.  
For readers of Breathe, what came to matter was not just what happened in the work 
itself, but what might be happening in the work. As readers’ situations (locations, local 
weather, time of day etc.) come to be incorporated within the piece, readers are left 
without knowing the exact mechanisms by which these variations within the text are 
introduced. For some readers, whether or not the entirety of the text is unique to their 
experience was questioned. Through the various affordances at play in the work – 
some of which might be completely obfuscated from the reader’s view – readers could 
be left wondering if the application was tracking their movement for days before 
reading. Through algorithmic sleights of hand, the application is able to use a sliver of 
geolocational data to spin out a web of implications for the reader.  
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With this, readers’ expectations for what the piece had to offer not only leaned in to 
supply what amounted to folk theories regarding the backend function of the 
application – at its most suspicious, readers thought of Google’s involvement with the 
piece and suspected persistent tracking of their movements – but also led readers to 
wonder what else might be possible. In coming to recognize the global assemblage at 
work, readers engage not just with the affordances of the interface present before them 
on the screen, but with the interface of the global system of technology as it is writ 
small into a short story-sized narrative. For Breathe, the key capacity of the assemblage 
comes to be its link to the larger and longer history and cultural paradigm of 
technology and the idea of technological progress.  
What this points to is the sense that readers’ engagement with the work is driven by a 
sense that they are engaged not just with the work as it is, but as it could come to be: 
in tapping into global networks of ICT and making these material pathways germane 
to the specific conditions of a meaningful narrative, the edges of the affordances as 
they are immediately present blur with what lies just beyond their reach. As this is 
linked to readers’ understandings and expectations of contemporary technology, the 
affordances at play are acted out at the level of the metainterface. Much like as 
discussed by both Gibson and DeLanda, the affordance or capacity of a system is not 
just what is present, but also what might yet be possible, but is still unknown. 
This develops a sense of the idea of affordances that, as described in the situational 
rendering by James Greeno (1994), are comprised of attunements and constraints. 
Readers are, on the one hand, attuned to what is going on, in a cultural sense. On the 
other, they are also cognizant of the constraints that are placed on them in any 
interactive setting. However, what Breathe and the other works of ambient literature 
present is an engagement with a cultural attunement in which the sheer idea of some 
kind of constraint on technological possibility is significantly tempered. In this, new 
media works like Breathe take as part of their interactive paradigm the idea that readers’ 
cognitive models allow the door to speculation to be left open. The capacities of these 
works, by virtue of the diffuse assemblage which makes them possible, become 
ambient distributed across the assemblage of the work. 
 
 MARCINKOWSKI | Ubiquitous Media 
 
 
 
181 
 
What is possible 
The central provocation that is put forward here is a wider and more fully material and 
realist account of the idea of affordances. This being the case, even as it points toward 
an ambient sense of affordances being linked to the possibilities of an assemblage.  
Instead of becoming bogged down with a worry over the difference between physical 
affordances and those that might be considered to be culturally rendered, what is 
proposed is a fully material rendering of the entire spectrum along a flattened ontology 
in which the facts of human culture are no different than the facts of the curve of a 
jug handle. Each present real systems that offer some capacity to be drawn into large 
assemblages. The complexities of the human hand as it is afforded the opportunity to 
grasp are not so different from the complexities of the human mind as it recognizes 
not just affordances across an ICT network, but also language. In this, the idea of the 
perceptual affordance is not so distinct from a rendering of physical symbol systems 
that affordances, when considered as capacities, can be thought of as existing between 
inanimate things, as in the case of computer codes and electrical switches.  
For a work like Breathe, this re-formulated approach to affordances in which the 
capacity for meaning is set equal to the capacity for physical interaction opens a way 
toward understanding audiences’ engagement with the work in new ways. For works 
of interactive media, affordances come to refer not only to those aspects that are 
immediately present in the interface, but also to those aspects that are only 
speculatively encountered or expected by audiences. These networked capacities for 
the elicitation of meaning raise questions in regard to how to think about chains of 
affordances in media and how the context of the affordance becomes part of the 
affordance itself.  
Affordances are simple things that, by their attendant capacities, are able to create 
complex webs of potential interactions. By re-framing affordances in this way, future 
links can be drawn between the classical understanding of affordances as they exist at 
the moment of interaction and the wider socio-technical setting in which our systems 
today function.  
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